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ARGUMENT ONE 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING THE DEFENDANT TO 
ESTABLISH HIS THEORY OF THE CASE THROUGH CROSS 
EXAMINATION OF WILLIAM CLARK 
In the Red Brief the State claims that the Cross Examination of Will Clark on the two key 
points of his testimony was more prejudicial than probative, i.e., (1) cross examination of Will 
Clark showing that he had to break into the Defendant's home to engage in sexual relations with 
Carmen and (2) establishing Will Clark as a participant in the scheme of the victim's fatal 
attraction and therefore not on Defendant's team at all. 
Here, the idea that it is more prejudicial than probative was more of an analysis by the 
Trial Court that amounted to a comment on the weight of the evidence rather than on its 
admissibility. 
The Trial Court stated on more than one occasion that the fatal attraction theory was 
fanciful and speculative by the Defendant and therefore the cross examination of Will Clark 
regarding the break-in to the Defendant's home would not have been that meaningful to the jury. 
This is tantamount to the trial Court deciding what weight, if any, should be given by the 
Jury. 
With all due respect to the Trial Court, the Trial Court is not allowed to decide what 
weight evidence may be appropriately determined by the Jury. 
The jury may well have thought that the actions by Carmen and Will in breaking into the 
Defendant's home was so overt and such an aggressive act by Will and Carmen that it could 
have well carried the day on the fatal attraction analysis. 
For the Trial Court to exclude this as testimony on the basis that the Jury may not find it 
that probative invades the jury room and the province true Triers of Fact. 
It is not like the Defendant had a mere scintilla of evidence that supported the fatal 
attraction theory as the evidence, as Counsel for the Appellant humbly submits, that evidence 
supporting the fatal attraction theory came from all sides of the Courtroom. 
Carmen herself testified of having a "crush" on the Defendant and the same lasted for a 
considerable period of time. 
Carmen told everyone she could about their relationship and bragged about the same over 
the course of many months according to every witness who testified regarding the same. 
(Transcript June 14, 2005 at page 24) 
Carmen further testified that she started rumors herself that she and the Defendant were 
intimate long before the timeframe she claimed that they were actually intimate. (Transcript June 
14, 2005 at page 24) 
It was universally established in the Trial Court that the Defendant was reconciling with 
his wife at the time that Carmen made her claims herein. (Transcript June 15, 2005 at page 176, 
June 16, 2005 at page 24 and June 17, 2005 at page 71) 
Appellant respectfully submits that there was significant evidence supporting the fatal 
attraction theory and that the preclusion of not allowing the Defendant to establish his theory of 
the case on the basis that the weight of that evidence was insignificant, clearly invaded the 
province of the jury. 
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As noted in the Blue Brief there is frankly nothing prejudicial at all in allowing the 
Defendant both to cross and confront this witness and more importantly there is no basis 
whatsoever to support the idea that the Defendant should not be allowed to fully present his 
theory of the case, through clearly relevant evidence. 
Appellant submits that the State completely ignored this notion that this evidence was 
more prejudicial than probative as nowhere in the Red Brief do they show this Court where there 
was any prejudice whatsoever. 
Their analysis boils down to the idea that Defendant should not be allowed to have this 
crucial evidence admitted into evidence because if he did the jury may believe his theory of the 
case and therefore find him innocent. 
It, of course, goes without saying that the Defendant has no burden whatsoever and does 
not need to prove his innocence, while the State on the other hand has to present evidence so 
overwhelming with guilt that it is beyond any reasonable doubt. 
Hence, in the final analysis in reference to the Red Brief the only "prejudice" that the 
State can claim is that the jury may well find this key link so compelling as to carry the day in 
raising a reasonable doubt. 
The State did not and cannot show this Court why it would be unfair to the State for the 
Trial Court to have allowed this confrontation and cross examination of Will Clark. 
Appellant submits that it is fairly obvious in the Red Brief that the State cannot claim 
unfairness as the State almost exclusively addressed other relevant factors like it might be 
confusing to the jury or that it would take too much time. 
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In the Red Brief, the State showed no basis whatsoever to suggest that this cross-
examination would be confusing to the jury, nor that it would take too much time. 
The jury spent four days dealing with conflicting evidence so to suggest that the cross-
examination would not be in harmony with the State's version of the events is no basis to 
exclude the evidence because the jury just might be confused. 
The State argues that the Appellant did not preserve this claim at the Trial Court level, 
however that lacks merit as it was raised in the September 14, 2005 transcript at pages 11,14 and 
15. 
As noted in the Blue Brief, the total time could not possibly exceed 5 minutes as there 
would be just a few basic questions and maybe some follow-up of Will Clark, i.e.: 
1. Where did you and Carmen engage in sexual relations? 
2. How did you get into the Defendant's home? 
3. Did the Defendant grant you permission to do that? 
4. Did you literally break into the home? 
5. Did Carmen insist that you engage in sex at that location? 
6. Did she tell you why? 
This simple inquiry may well have been the centerpiece to the Defendant's theory on the 
case. 
This evidence becomes critically relevant for two lines of thought, (1) that it shows a 
flaw in the State's case and (2) it establishes, very aggressive conduct on Carmen's part in 
support of a fatal attraction theory. 
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Appellant submits that it is one thing for the Trial Court to prevent this line of 
questioning because of timeliness weighed against the value of attacking the State's case in 
chief, however it is altogether a different analysis when the Trial Court prevents the Defendant 
from pursuing his theory of the case. 
Defendant acknowledges the fact that the Trial Court allowed the Defense to establish 
that Will Clark and Carmen Johnson engaged in sexual relations, however as noted in the Blue 
Brief where the sex occurred is the only thing that makes this relevant, not the mere fact that two 
teenagers engaged in pre-marital sex standing alone. 
It is important to note that Will Clark did not even consider Carmen to be his good 
friend. 
This fact does not go to the issue of promiscuity of Carmen but squarely, when coupled 
with where the sex occurred, to support the Defendant's theory of fatal attraction. 
In the Red Brief the State argues that the testimony of Will Clark and where the alleged 
sex actually occurred was wholly speculative by the Defendant. 
It is as if to say we are not going to allow Will to testify regarding this matter and then 
after precluding the same stating we now need to speculate as to what his testimony would have 
been. 
Appellant submits that this is particularly unfair to the Defendant when the Trial Court 
does not allow the testimony and then confirms the same in suggesting that we now have to 
speculate as to what Will would have said. 
Defendant submits that this causes a double harm to a meaningful Defense. 
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It is the understanding of Counsel for the Defendant that Will Clark and Carmen Johnson 
went to quite great extremes so that Carmen could engage in sex in the Defendant's home. 
Counsel for the Defendant submits, as noted in the Blue Brief, that this act was so blatant 
and so probative of the fatal attraction theory that the jury would be compelled to find the 
Defendant not guilty. 
Simply stated, the preclusion of this evidence, not only violated the State and Federal 
Constitutionally protected rights of confrontation and cross-examination, it wholly deprived the 
Defendant of his opportunity to present a meaningful defense theory. 
Counsel submits that the Trial Court only considered the idea of cross-examination for 
purposes of challenging the State's case and wholly overlooked the pure probative value of the 
same being the centerpiece of the Defendant's meaningful defense theory. 
The State claims in the Red Brief, that this issue was not preserved at the Trial Court 
level, however, the Defendant submits that that claim is without merits, as the issue was fully 
discussed in chambers off of the Record, and then when the Court made its ruling as found on 
page 33, of the September 14, 2006 Transcript the Court specifically stated that this ruling did 
not violate the constitutional protections of the Defendant: 
"I conclude that it was a fair trial and the defendant was given every right and 
constitutional protected - protection that he is entitled to under the law." 
Counsel for the Appellant submits that the Claim by the State that the Constitutional 
issues were not raise before the Trial Court is wholly without merit, as it was the full basis for 
claiming that the Defendant's rights of confrontation and cross examination were violated. 
6 
In the Red Brief at page 38, the State suggests that the Defendant was not prejudiced in 
any way because in Closing Argument, Defense Counsel argued the "fatal attraction" theory. 
"Defense counsel thus adequately articulated defendant's "fatal attraction" theory to the 
jury based on other evidence in the record." 
Counsel for the Appellant suggests that this is most misleading for two reasons, (1) No 
one is claiming on Appeal or otherwise that Counsel was precluded from arguing the "fatal 
attraction" theory, and (2) The claim on Appeal as well as before the Trial Court was that the 
Defendant was precluded from putting on the evidence to support the theory of "fatal attraction." 
It seems quite obvious that arguing a matter before the Jury in Closing Argument, where 
there is evidence that is lacking, is all talk, and in fact the Jury was and should be instructed that 
what Counsel says is not evidence and should not be considered as evidence by the Jury. 
Hence the idea that Counsel was allowed to argue the Defendant's theory wholly misses 
the point, as the position of the Defendant is absolutely clear, and that is that the preclusion of 
inquiring of Will Clark as to the location of their sexual relations and the literal break into the 
Defendant's home to engage in the same violated both the Defendant's constitutional rights to 
confront and cross examine the State's witnesses and secondly it prevented the Defendant from 
substantiating his claim and presenting his evidence supporting the theory of the Defense. 
The Trial Court and the State in their Red Brief, both argued that the fact that the young 
people had sex in the home of the Defendant could be for reasons other than the fatal attraction 
theory, i.e.: that the young man lived there at one point or that the young man may have felt that 
he had license to enter the home, etc. 
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Appellant submits that these arguments are without merit, as the Defendant had no 
knowledge that the same occurred until after the fact and most importantly, perhaps, is the fact 
that the young people broke into the home to have sex. 
Again, the State argues that this claim was not preserved at the Trial Court level, however 
Counsel at the Trial Court level proffered to the Court what the testimony of Will Clark would 
have been had he been allowed to cross-examine him. (Transcript September 14, 2005 at page 
11) 
As noted in the Blue Brief, these young people could have engaged in their sexual 
encounter world wide, yet broke into the Defendant's home for a reason. 
Counsel for the Appellant respectfully submits that the analysis that there are other 
reasons that the young people engaged in sex in the Defendant's home completely misses the 
point. 
The evidence that Defendant expected Will Clark and Carmen Johnson to testify about, 
as proffered to the Trial Court, was that Carmen engaged in her sexual encounter in the 
Defendant's home as the next best to having sex with the Defendant himself. 
As articulated in the Blue Brief, these young people were not even good friends, 
however, Carmen was in such a fantasyland about the Defendant that she was determined to have 
sex with whomever, as long as it was in the Defendant's home. 
The mere fact that one can argue that there may have been other explanations as to why 
they did it in the Defendant's home is no basis whatsoever to prevent the Defendant from putting 
on his theory of the case, nor allowing him to challenge the State's case against him. 
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On pages 14 and 15 of the Blue Brief, the Appellant set forth the standard to be applied in 
limiting cross-examination and cited the case of State vs. Gonzales, 205 UT 72, at page 14, in 
paragraph #47: 
However, denial of the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses presents a question 
of law, which is reviewed, for correctness. Lander vs. Industrial Commission of Utah, 
894 P.2d 552, 554 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
The Sixth Amendment right to confrontation "guarantees the right of an accused in a 
criminal prosecution 'to be confronted with the witnesses against him.'" Davis vs. 
Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315 (1974) (quoting U.S. Constitution Amenment VI). Cross 
Examination is the tool that gives practical effect to the right of confrontation. Id. 
Through its use, an accused can test the believability and the truthfulness of a witness's 
testimony. Id. At 315-16. However, "the right of cross-examination is not without 
limitation." State vs. Hackford, 737 P.2d 200, 203 (Utah 1987). 
For example, "the right to cross-examine 'does not entail the right to harass, annoy, or 
humiliate (the) witness on cross examination, nor to engage in repetitive questioning, nor 
to inquire into matters which would expose the witness to danger of physical harm.'" Id. 
(quoting State vs. Chestnut, 621 P.2d 1228, 1233 (Utah 1980)). Likewise, Utah Rule of 
Evidence 403 excludes relevant evidence "if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence. 
In the Red Brief that State has made out no claim whatsoever that allowing the 
confrontation, cross-examination and the development of the Defendant's case involving a "fatal 
attraction" through Cross Examination of Will Clark and Carmen Johnson would in any way 
"harass, annoy, or humiliate (the) witness on cross examination, nor to engage in repetitive 
questioning, nor to inquire into matters which would expose the witness to danger of physical 
harm." 
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A careful review of the Red Brief shows that the State does not even so much as claim 
the same. 
The State did claim in the Red Brief that the "probative value" was out weighted by the 
prejudicial effect, however, the State boldly stated the standard but never showed this Court 
where this in fact existed. 
In the Blue Brief, Appellant argued that there was no prejudice whatsoever, and the State 
in the Red Brief, essentially conceded the same as they have shown this Court none. 
Appellant argued in the Blue brief that the preclusion was "unfair prejudice" as 
effectively the State was allowed to run with their case and put on their evidence, but the 
Defendant had no similar opportunity. 
Additionally the State was allowed through every single witness to cross examine on 
anything the State wanted to challenge, but the same can not be said of the Defendant, as the 
Defendant was prevented in reference to his most valuable evidence, as proffered to the Trial 
Court. 
In the Blue Brief, the Appellant pointed out that there would be no "confusion of the 
issues" as the inquiry as to where the sex occurred and why there are very simple facts and are 
not confusing in anyway. 
The State on the other hand could not claim the same, and surely made no showing of 
how that was the case. 
10 
In the Blue Brief, the Appellant pointed out that this evidence was not "misleading the 
jury" in any way, as the evidence was not tricky, etc., as it was a mere cross examination of the 
State's own witness. 
The State on the other hand could not claim the same, and surely made no showing of 
how that was the case. 
In the Blue Brief, the Appellant pointed out that this evidence would not cause any 
"undue delay." 
The State on the other hand could not claim the same, and surely made no showing of 
how that was the case 
In the Blue Brief, the Appellant pointed out that presenting this evidence would not in 
any way be a "waste of time". 
The State on the other hand could not claim the same, and surely made no showing of 
how that was the case 
Lastly, there can be no claim that the evidence was a "needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence." 
Appellant submits that the State can not establish, in any way, that the "probative value 
was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation 
of cumulative evidence." (emphasis added) 
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Hence, the Constitutional mandates as recited in the Blue Brief compelled a reversal on 
the verdict, particularly in light of the clear mandate established in the United States Supreme 
Court case of Davis vs. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974). 
The standard here is found in State vs. Tuttle, 780 P.2d 1203, 1213 (Utah 1989) as one 
can not say that beyond a reasonable doubt the result would not be difference, if Defendant had 
been afforded his fundamental Constitutional rights. 
ARGUMENT TWO 
THE COURT SHOULD GRANT A NEW TRIAL BY VIRTUE OF PROSECUTORIAL 
MISCONDUCT 
In the Blue Brief the Appellant argues that there was prosecutorial error in reference to 
two matters that were raised in the closing argument: 
1. The "scoop the kids" theory where the Defendant allegedly scooped up his own 
kids and put them in different beds, so that his bed would be available to commit 
the alleged crimes, and 
2. The "William Clark" theory, that Will Clark was on the Defendant's team and had 
no motive to testify for the alleged victim Carmen Johnson. 
In the Blue Brief the Appellant showed this Court that in reference to the first element of 
prosecutorial misconduct that the Prosecutor proposed to the jury a theory that was based not 
only on speculation with no evidence to support the same, but contrary to every witness who 
testified regarding the same. 
The Prosecutor suggested that when the young ladies had entered the Defendant's 
premises, the Defendant then scooped up his kids and put them elsewhere in the house so he 
could free up his bed to have sex with the alleged victims. 
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Appellant submits that this was the only theory given the jury by the Prosecution and if 
the jury found the Appellant guilty based on this theory then the verdict is based on pure 
speculation. 
In the Red Brief the State does not argue that the Prosecutor did not make these exact 
statements to the jury. 
The State does not claim that the representation as to what the Prosecutor said to the 
jury was overstated in the Blue Brief in any way or inaccurate as to any detail. The State 
concedes in the Red Brief that the Prosecutor submitted this theory exactly to the jury. 
The State also concedes in the Red Brief that this was the only theory given the jury, as 
the State does not challenge that position taken in the Blue Brief. 
As a result of the foregoing, all parties agree that the Prosecutor made as his sole theory 
the idea that the Defendant scooped up his kids and removed them to other parts of the house so 
that he could engage the alleged victims in sex in the master bedroom. 
It is interesting to note in the Red Brief that the State did not and cannot point to one 
scintilla of evidence that supports the same. 
It is not like the State said in their Red Brief "Oh here is where the witness said 
something to that effect" or "Here is where the evidence is that supports that statement to the 
jury." 
It is most interesting to note in the Red Brief that the State does not argue that the jury 
was given any alternative theory to support a verdict of guilty. 
The State does not suggest that the verdict was based on any other sequence of events. 
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According to the case law in the State of Utah in the case of State vs. Parsons, 781 P.2d 
1275, 1284 (Utah 1989), the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
Look to see if the actions or remarks of counsel call to the attention of the jury a matter it 
would not be justified in considering in determining its verdict and, if so, under the 
circumstances of the particular case, whether the error is substantial and prejudicial such 
that there is a reasonable likelihood that in its absence, there would have been a more 
favorable result for the defendant. 
In the Parsons case the Supreme Court made a distinction between a Prosecutor who 
states as fact something that has no support in the evidence in contrast with a Prosecutor who 
merely argues facts that are evidence. 
Here the Prosecutor stated in open Court that he had personally visited the premises and 
had a certain degree of firsthand knowledge regarding the matter, additionally the Prosecutor 
made a personal visit to Texas to interview Carmen so he would know firsthand the underlying 
facts. (Transcript June 14, 2005 at page 119) 
In closing argument this same Prosecutor then submits certain facts to the jury, which 
came out of nobody's mouth at any time except the Prosecutor's. 
The State does not argue anywhere in the Red Brief where the statements of the 
Prosecutor regarding the Defendant scooping up his own kids and placing them in different beds 
was in any way arguing facts that were in evidence. 
The Red Brief shows this Court that there is nowhere in any of the transcripts, any of the 
exhibits, pictures, letters, etc., where there is a scintilla of evidence, outside the Prosecutor 
claiming firsthand knowledge of some facts and his saying these facts to the jury. 
14 
Hence, the only support for the Prosecutor supplying evidence versus comment on the 
evidence is his own personal visit to Texas and his own personal visit to the subject premises. 
(Transcript June 14, 2005 at page 119) 
The two alleged victims, Carmen Johnson and Sage Weinglass, never at any time 
suggested that the Defendant ever scooped up the kids and moved them elsewhere. 
The Defendant and all of his witnesses testified that his kids were in bed with him 
during all the time in question and were awakened by the two-alarm fire siren, or their mother, at 
the time of the fire which occurred long before the sun came up. (Transcript June 15,2005 
beginning at page 140 and following) 
Hence, it is undisputed that the sole source for this evidence regarding scooping up the 
children and placing them elsewhere came exclusively from Brody Keisel, the Prosecutor. 
In the case of State vs. Bryant 965 P.2d 539, 550 (Utah App. 1998), the Utah Court of 
Appeals stated: 
A prosecutor engages in misconduct when he or she asserts personal knowledge of the 
facts in issue or expresses personal opinion, being 'a form of unsworn, unchecked 
testimony [which] tend[s] to exploit the influence of the prosecutor's office and 
undermine the objective detachment that should separate a lawyer from the cause being 
argued.' 
In the Red Brief apparently the State concedes that the Prosecutor submitted facts to the 
jury, which came from the sole source of the Prosecutor himself. 
These actions by the Prosecutor cannot be argued as merely a comment on the evidence 
or otherwise arguing the evidence to the jury, rather it is undisputed that these statements of fact 
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by the Prosecutor who had informed the jury that he had at least some personal firsthand 
knowledge of the facts before the Court, came from no other source whatsoever. 
Appellant submits that one cannot in good faith suggest on appeal that this misconduct 
was inconsequential, as there was no other theory submitted to the jury that would support a 
conviction herein. 
Furthermore, the State in the Red Brief suggests no other theory that the Jury could have 
convicted on, except the one submitted in closing argument. 
Appellant respectfully submits that there can be no question that there was obvious 
Prosecutorial Misconduct and that the same had an overwhelming effect on the Jury, as no one 
has even suggested to this Court that there was any other theory than the scoop up the children 
theory for the Jury to convict. 
The Trial Court had an interesting analysis that Appellant feels compelled to address 
here, and that is the Trial Court concluded that the scoop up the children theory was not really 
the theory proposed by the Prosecution, rather it was merely an explanation of conflicting 
evidence. 
Appellant respectfully submits that this is in fact not the case, as the Prosecutor made the 
scoop up the children as his sole theory to the Jury. 
It is not like the Prosecutor stated his theory on the case and then as a matter of 
explanation of conflicting evidence he resorts to the scoop up the children. 
Rather the Prosecutor's theory was that there was harmony between the children's 
testimony and the alleged victims testimony. 
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The scoop up the children theory was the heart and sole of the closing argument by the 
Prosecution, and frankly the only way, apparently, that the Prosecutor could get around the 
innocent children's testimony and that of the alleged victims. 
After the fact, one cannot suggest that, "Well the Jury did not need that explanation in 
order to convict." As no one knows what carried the day in the Jury Room. 
Therefore the distinction between what the Jury found relevant and what the Jury did not 
find relevant is pure speculation, as the Jury is the sole Trier of Fact, and their deliberations and 
mental process are unknown, except to them. 
Hence, in the final analysis it can be said that the misconduct was exactly what has been 
stated in the Blue Brief as well as here in the Gray Brief, and the same had to have had a major 
impact on the Jury as there was no other explanation given by the Prosecution. 
The scoop up the children theory has really two elements to it that need to be addressed: 
1. Prosecutor said that the Defendant scooped up the kids and removed them from 
his bed so that the Defendant could engage the young women in sex, and 
2. The Prosecutor said that the Defendant scooped up the kids after his alleged 
crimes and put them back in the bed with him, before the fire alarm went off. 
The theory here by the State was that the kids had to wake up in his bed and that is why 
the Defendant had to put them back in his bed after the alleged events. 
A careful analysis of this suggests that the Defendant knew the fire alarm was going to go 
off and had to be sure that the kids were in his bed when that happened, so that they would 
remember being awakened at that specific location and time. 
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Appellant submits that it would be amazing to suggest to a jury that somehow my guy 
knew that the two-alarm fire was going to go off in the middle of the night. 
In addition to the Prosecutorial Misconduct regarding the scoop up the children, is the 
misconduct regarding the commenting of Will Clark being on the Defendant's team. 
As noted in the Blue Brief, Appellant attempted to get the Trial Court to allow him to 
show to the Jury where Will Clark was part of the fatal attraction scheme of the alleged victims. 
This was clearly relevant and admissible as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity and absence of mistake or accident. 
The Trial Court ruled that the Defendant would not be allowed to cross-examine Will 
Clark regarding the scheme and particularly where the admitted sexual intercourse occurred. 
Therefore there can be no question that the Prosecutor knew of the link between the 
alleged victims and Will Clark. 
Notwithstanding this foreknowledge of the Prosecutor argued to the Jury that Will Clark 
had motivations that sided with the Defendant, when in reality Will was part of the scheme by 
the alleged victims. 
As pointed out in the Blue Brief, Will Clark brought no relevant evidence to bear. 
Will testified that the Defendant had admitted on a different occasion that Defendant had 
engaged in oral sex with the alleged victim. 
This was highly inflammatory and extremely prejudicial as the victim, Carmen Johnson 
denied that it ever happened and so did the Defendant. (Transcript June 16, 2005 at page 44) 
18 
Hence, this evidence was merely a smear on the Defendant and had no other bearing 
whatsoever, and particularly because it was another time and place and something that was not 
ever part of the charges against the Defendant. 
Will Clark also testified that on a different occasion he thought that the Defendant had 
consumed some alcohol. 
The Defendant himself testified that when Tory, his wife, left him he was pretty 
despondent and so he consumed some alcohol, so Defendant admitted that he drank at times. 
However, Will Clark's testimony did not support the charges of providing alcohol to 
minors because he did not observe any such thing and could not testify regarding the same. 
Hence, the testimony of Will Clark regarding the alcohol consumption was again just a 
smear on the Defendant. 
All of this garbage testimony by Will Clark was clearly more prejudicial that probative, 
and in fact on a scale of one to ten was a full ten on prejudicial and zero on probative. 
On the other hand, the initial damage to the Defendant by the ruling of the Trial Court 
that the Defendant would not be allowed to present evidence of where the sex occurred was 
severe. 
Yet when the Prosecutor then comments, unfairly, regarding Will Clark's motivation, the 
prejudice and the unfairness goes off the charts. 
The misconduct by the Prosecutor was not accidental, as Counsel for the Defendant had 
vigorously argued that Defendant should be allowed to cross examine Will Clark as to the 
location of the sex and how that was a part of the fatal attraction theory of the Defense. 
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After very strenuous argument against allowing the Defendant the opportunity to show 
the Jury Will Clark's allegiance to the alleged victims, the Prosecutor proceeds to further 
compound the injury and damage to the Defendant by stressing in closing argument how Will 
Clark was really on the Defendant's team after all. 
This totally exacerbated the damage to the Defendant and the trampling on his 
Constitutional rights. 
Appellant respectfully submits that this Prosecutorial Misconduct clearly rose to the level 
that this Court must mandate that the Defendant be granted a new trial with specific instructions 
regarding the same. 
ARGUMENT THREE 
THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT A NEW TRIAL 
In the Red Brief the State argues that there was clearly sufficient evidence to convict 
because the two young women corroborated each other as to what allegedly happened. 
The State completely overlooked the undisputed fact that Carmen Johnson gave between 
four and five different versions as to what happened and Sage Weinglass gave eight different 
versions as to what happened, and the two young ladies were allegedly consistent with one 
another in but one version of what happened. 
Appellant submits that the corroboration on the one version is meaningless because of 
what is found in the Addendum of the Blue Brief as Trial Exhibit No. 3. 
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Trial Exhibit No. 3, which was addressed in the trial on June 14, 2005 beginning at page 
8, shows that the two girls exchanged a letter between themselves to spell out what version they 
would run with.. 
In this case Carmen wrote the letter to Sage suggesting to Sage what Carmen wanted her 
to say. It is literally as if the two girls wrote out a version as to what to say. 
Hence, the argument that the girls corroborated each other is without merit as it is 
undisputed that Carmen wrote a letter to Sage so that the parties could be consistent with one 
another. 
This document speaks for itself. 
Appellant submits that it is particularly noteworthy that Sage Weinglass stood up to the 
Prosecutor at trial and maintained her position in reference to the eight different versions of what 
happened as being materially different from one another. 
As noted in the transcript of June 14, 2005, beginning at page 204 and following, the 
Prosecutor attempted to get Sage Weinglass to admit that there were just minor deviations in her 
eight different versions. 
A careful reading of the transcript shows that Sage disagreed with the Prosecutor and 
stated openly that the multiple versions were clearly materially different and were not just the 
same old story with minor deviations. 
Hence, the claim by the State that the girls corroborated one another is in the final 
analysis meaningless as it was undisputed testimony that Carmen sent Exhibit 3 to Sage so that 
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their stories could be in harmony on at least one of the versions, which is the only version of the 
many given that involved the Defendant having sex with the alleged victims. 
In the Red Brief the State suggests that the victims' corroborated version was bolstered 
by the State's rebuttal witnesses. 
Appellant submits that this is not true as the State called two witnesses as rebuttal 
witnesses, i.e. Will Clark and Devon Lucas. 
These two witnesses were at best mere smear witnesses as neither one testified about 
anything that occurred on the day in question, i.e. February 22, 2004. 
Devon Lucas testified that her grade was reduced because she was spreading a rumor that 
Carmen Johnson and Defendant were engaged in sexual relations at a totally different time and 
place. 
This testimony had no bearing on the charges but was strictly a smear campaign on the 
Defendant. 
Furthermore, the reduction of her grade was because she had cheated on a test and was 
caught in the act. (Transcript June 16, 2005 at page 100) 
Hence, her testimony had nothing to do with the charges and was highly inflammatory 
and very prejudicial, yet was allowed over the strenuous objection of Counsel for the Defendant. 
Will Clark's testimony was that Defendant told him that at a time and place wholly 
different than the charges at hand the Defendant and Carmen had oral sex. 
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This was pure smear and had nothing to do with the charges and frankly both Carmen and 
the Defendant stated that at no time did they, the alleged participants, ever engage in any kind of 
oral sex. (Transcript June 16, 2005 at page 44) 
Will Clark also testified that on a different occasion he thought Defendant had consumed 
some alcohol. 
This again is pure smear as the charges against the Defendant was that he supplied 
alcohol to minors and so whether or not the Defendant consumed alcohol on another occasion 
was nothing more than smear on the Defendant. 
Furthermore, as noted above, Defendant admitted that he was despondent when Tory left 
him and he turned to alcohol for that brief time in his life so the testimony from Will Clark did 
not even so much as impeach the Defendant. 
Hence, the claim by the State that the rebuttal witnesses bolstered the alleged victims 
version of the facts is wholly without merit, as no rebuttal witness ever testified even in the 
slightest way about anything that occurred on the day in question, or could otherwise be 
construed as bolstering the version of the alleged victims regarding the events of February 22, 
2004. 
In the Red Brief the State claims that the Appellant did not preserve the insufficient 
evidence claim at the Trial Court. 
Appellant submits that this is wholly without merit as the same was raised with the Trial 
Court in the Motion for a New Trial found throughout the September 14, 2005 Transcript as well 
as the Defendant's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and the Defendant's 
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Motion to arrest the judgment as noted throughout the August 3, 2005 transcript. Also not the 
written Motions of all three of the same. 
The Court specifically ruled on page 30 of the September 14, 2005 transcript that the 
Trial Court had carefully considered the claim by the Defendant that there was insufficient 
evidence to support the verdict. 
Lastly, the State claims in the Red Brief that the Appellant failed to marshal the evidence. 
Appellant submits that this too is wholly without merit as the entire Statement of Facts 
found in the Blue Brief is an exact marshalling of the evidence that supports the verdict and the 
same are referenced as to the Transcript and the Record as to each stated fact. 
Appellant submits that it is dispositive to note that the State did not show this Court one 
single fact that the Appellant failed to marshal. 
Appellant submits that he has fully marshaled all of the evidence to support the verdict 
and his arguments in Argument Three of the Blue Brief stand uncontested now on appeal. 
Hence, the State does not even refute the fact "that the evidence to support the verdict 
was completely lacking or was so slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly 
unreasonable and unjust." State vs. Stringham, 2001 UT 13, (Utah, 2001) 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant submits that perhaps the best evidence of what actually happened comes from 
Carmen Johnson at page 24 of the June 14, 2005 Transcript where Carmen Johnson stated under 
oath that she made up the rumors that she and the Defendant had engaged in sexual relations. 
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Here she admits that she had this crush on the Defendant and so she was making up 
rumors and telling the whole student body that she and the Defendant were having sex. 
She ultimately got her best friend, Sage Wienglass (Transcript of June 14, 2005 at page 
38) to confirm her story, as Carmen wrote out the version that Sage was to say as to what 
happened. (Trial Exhibit No. 3, in Blue Addendum) 
Appellant submits that it is impossible for the girls to have done what they claimed to 
have done and not be aware of the ugly scars that were on the Defendant's body. Exhibits No. 7 
and No 8, show the scar when the Defendant had his shoulder reconstructed and Exhibit No. 9 
shows the scar as big as a baseball, in the groin area of the Defendant of when he tried to catch 
the home run in the ninth grade, and jumped over the outfield fence, which caught him and had 
him suspended in the sky, until they could lift him off the fence vertically as the fence had 
literally stabbed him and held his suspended in the sky. 
Each side here claims that the other side is lying, but the pictures do not lie and they 
clearly and unequivocally speak for themselves. 
There can be no question that the young ladies would have seen the scars as the young 
ladies claimed that the lighting was so good during the time in question that they could read the 
label on the Vodka (Transcript June 14, 2005 at page 195). 
RELIEF SOUGHT (Q—^ 
Appellant requests that the Verdict be set aside and chargp^igmis^f^A/ J 
Dated this 10th of August, 2006. / / ^ l M 
JOHMWALSH 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
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